// Directive: X0483
By SIRM
Part One
Even though we cannot see them, undersea communication cables are critical to states’ national and economic security. They underpin global communications and commerce: the most capable optical fibre cables transmit up to 10 Gbps (10 billion bits per second) of data, a vital commodity described as the world’s “new gold.” Whenever we read an email, share a video on social media, or search the internet, the information travels through these submarine fibre optic cables that are as thin as a garden hose. Companies like Google, Instagram, Meta, Huawei, and SoftBank rely on these cables as the lifeblood of their operations.
A cut cable can disrupt data transmission, delay financial transactions, and could, in extremis, isolate whole countries from the internet. Low Earth orbit (LEO) satellite networks can often provide some resilience, but at present do not provide the same efficiency in data transmission as undersea cables. Nevertheless, governments are investing in satellite technologies, such as the EU’s IRIS2 (Infrastructure for Resilience, Interconnectivity and Security by Satellite) program, to create more secure, alternative communication channels.
Continued reliance in the immediate term on undersea communication cables unfortunately makes them an attractive target for those seeking to do others harm, as recent incidents in the Baltic Sea and the Taiwan Strait attest.
Concern about seabed infrastructure grabbed the world’s attention from late 2022, when multiple underwater explosions occurred on the Nord Stream pipelines in the Baltic Sea. Ever since, governments and other interested parties have earnestly been seeking ways to better mitigate the risks associated with potential disruption to undersea critical infrastructure and particularly the communication cables network. Given that our prosperity and daily life is only going to become more reliant on data transmitted across undersea communication cables, it is exceptionally important to consider options for enhancing resilience.
Part two
The interconnected nature of these cables means that disruptions in one region can impact multiple countries and continents, underscoring the vital role they play in facilitating global connectivity an commerce.
Take for instance the incident in early 2024 in the Red Sea that led to three cables being cut. The cables were severed after the severely damaged and drifting MV Rubymar, a Belize-flagged bulk carrier, reportedly struck by two ballistic missiles, dragged its anchors across the seabed in desperation. Resultant internet outages were reported in East Africa from Tanzania and Kenya, to Uganda and Mozambique and negatively impacted the internet as far away as Vietnam, Thailand, and Singapore in Southeast Asia.
At first glance, it might appear sensible for like-minded states in a region to lay and supervise a cable system independent of the global undersea cable network. Building a walled-off network – an attempt at cable autarky, in a way – could offer states a seemingly secure data transmission method. However, this will certainly be costly and likely impractical. For one thing, isolating data flows limits access to the full value of undersea cables, as their worth lies not in their physical structure but in high-speed, interconnected data they carry across continents. Without interconnected networks, states risk losing access to the immense volume of global commerce and communications, thus limiting the cables’ utility.
This interdependence does have upsides too. Truly global cable interconnectivity may reduce the appeal of sabotage for state attackers. If a cable is severed in a connected network, the impact could be felt by all – perhaps not equally, but enough to deter action. Cable severing would then be an act of self-harm. Not all attackers, however, will be dissuaded by this logic of unintended consequences. The need to build-in greater resilience in the cable network and for better collaboration among states and companies remains a pressing concern.
Part three
Building resilience into cable networks needs to combine physical hardening, strategic routing, redundancy, improved monitoring, and a greater ability to recover after an incident.
Physical hardening can be achieved by using stronger materials and more robust designs that make cables more resistant to attacks and seawater degradation. Armoured and buried sections, along with multiple fibres in the same cable, provide a stronger baseline for resilience. Landing stations – where cables emerge from the sea onto land – must also be fortified where there is an identified risk.
Furthermore, enhanced surveillance and monitoring of undersea cables through deploying advanced monitoring systems, to include uncrewed undersea vessels, would help detect and deter threats.
Cables can be routed away from high-risk zones like earthquake-prone areas or busy shipping lanes, to reduce accidental risks. Although re-routing away from strategic chokepoints such as the Straits of Hormuz or Bob al-Mandeb is infeasible, undersea cables can be laid to bypass sites of regional tension. This approach also has limitations. Whilst companies like Meta or Google might avoid landing cables in what the US government sees as high-risk areas such as Hong Kong, much of it s data flows will inevitably rely on and be be routed across cables connected through China.
Major cable companies and consortia already lay multipl, geographically diverse cable routes to minimize disruption when one cable goes offline. When cables in the Red Sea were severed, for example, HGC Global Communications, a Hong Kong based internet service provider, rerouted its traffic through alternative paths. More prearranged redundancy arrangements, supported by agreements between operators and telecommunications companies, would help ensure rapid recovery of data traffic.
One crucial measure that would disproportionately enhance cable resilience is to increase the supply of cable repair vessels. These vessels play an indispensable role in installing protective measures, performing routine inspections, and repairing severed cables. However, there are only about 60 cable repair ships in service, either installing a new cable or repairing a cable.
Over the medium-to-long term, resilience is best achieved by transmitting a greater share of data transmission through satellite networks. Technology in this area is evolving rapidly. Satellites able to communicate with an optical ground station (OGS) network using lasers, for example, can carry data at rates potentially 1,000 times higher than that of the radio-frequency links typically used for satellite communications.
Part four
But whose network is it to protect? Most of the approximately 1.4 million kilometers of submarine cables are funded by private companies or public-private partnerships, with telecommunications companies operating the cables and a few major global firms responsible for building and repairing the network such as Japan’s NEC Corporation, the US’s Subcom, and France’s Alcatel. But this is changing rapidly.
China, a cable newcomer, is represented by the HMN Tech, now a major cable layer and operator
reportedly subsidized by Beijing. The configuration of private companies in the cable business is also shifting. Major data enterprises like Meta and Google, Microsoft, and Amazon increasingly fund cable construction because their viability and financial wellbeing depend on the very traffic-financial, personal, and commercial—that goes across these cables.
The health of the undersea cables benefits not only individual organizations and states but also the entire global economic, financial, and communication ecosystem. This ecosystem includes data centers operated by the big tech companies, global service providers like Netflix and Disney, and global data services via software providers such as LinkedIn.
These cables do not merely support these private companies; they are integral to a broader, interdependent ecosystem that spans states and regions, contributing to what we know as the global economy. Private-sector involvement via cable companies has always been the mainstay of this ecosystem. And their role is growing. This strengthens the case for public-private collaboration and an injection of resources from all concerned sides to secure these cables.
To build longer term resiliency—whilst retaining efficiency—to data flows that are currently carried along vulnerable undersea cables, better combining R&D financing and pipelines from the public and commercial sectors in emerging satellite technologies will be critical.
Part Five
A Partner in Building Secure Futures
SIRM stands as a trusted partner for asset owners, investors, and risk management professionals operating in volatile and complex environments.
By embracing a holistic and forward-thinking approach to security and risk management, SIRM not only safeguards today’s community and business environment integrity for those investors and communities directly involved, but also lays the foundation for a planned, sustainable and secure future.
Through its unique combination of military precision, technological innovation, and a commitment to excellence, SIRM redefines what it means to secure tomorrow, today.
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